Unions have spent members’ money on politics for as long as there have been unions, on a simple theory: spend, and you get ballot measures that go your way, allies in office, and laws. We followed that money through all five links of the chain — $175.4M of ballot-measure spending across 12 states, 5,361 candidates, 55 legislator-by-legislator comparisons. Two links hold. Two break. One we could not settle at all.
Their side won 33 of the 49 measures we could settle — 54 committees, $175.4M of union money, 12 states, 2014 to 2025. By dollars it is closer: the two largest bets in the entire file both lost.
A legislator a union funds is the primary sponsor of 4.2× more pro-labor bills. Not simply because they are busier — the same legislators write only 1.4× more bills of every kind.
Pro-labor bills from funded legislators pass at 57.6%, against 56.5% for everyone else’s. The extra bills get written and then die at the ordinary rate.
About 2 points more agreement with labor on final passage, across 55 within-party comparisons, with a range of −5.0 to +18.1.
Six states, 5,361 candidates, and results running from −0.5 to +42 points. The deepest and best-documented sample shows nothing at all.
A ballot measure is the cleanest test available. There is no incumbency, no party label, no candidate biography — just two sides, a disclosed budget each, and a certified result. We swept twelve states’ campaign-finance records from 2014 onward for committees campaigning on a named measure. 54 of them took union money, $175.4M of it. Forty-nine have been decided.
The union’s side won 33 of the 49 settled measures and lost 16 — a two-in-three record. Measured in dollars rather than measures, it is much closer: $98.4M sat on the winning side and $61.3M on the losing side, 62%, because the two biggest bets in the file both lost.
| The six largest union bets | Union money | Share of campaign | Union’s side |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA Prop 15, 2020Tax commercial property for schools | $35.8M | 65.7% | Lostfailed 52–48 |
| CA Prop 50, 2025Redraw the congressional maps | $27.0M | 28.7% | Wonpassed, about 64–36 |
| CA Prop 55, 2016Extend the high-earner income tax | $18.3M | 54.7% | Wonpassed 62.3% |
| CA Prop 22, 2020Gig drivers stay contractors | $18.0M | 94.8% | Lostpassed 59% |
| WA I-2124, 2024Opt out of the WA Cares program | $10.4M | 99.0% | Wonrejected 55.5–44.5 |
| CA Prop 30, 2022Tax on incomes over $2M for electric vehicles | $5.3M | 99.2% | Wonrejected 59–41 |
“Won” and “lost” describe the union’s side, not the measure. On four of these six, the union was campaigning against a measure, so a rejected measure is a win. Share of the campaign is union money as a proportion of everything that committee raised. Each measure links to its full background; results can also be looked up at California’s Secretary of State and Washington’s results archives.
Two entries deserve reading twice. Proposition 22 is the sharpest case in the project. Labor paid for 94.8% of the No campaign — roughly $18M, essentially the entire opposition — and was outspent about ten to one by the app companies. It passed with 59%. And Proposition 15 is the largest single union bet anywhere in the data: $35.8M, two-thirds of its campaign, and it failed by four points.
So the win rate is real and the dollar-weighted picture is more sober. Where unions are one funder among many in a modest campaign, their side usually prevails. On the handful of nine-figure fights that decide the most, being the whole opposition has not been enough.
The next link is legislative. Take every state legislator a union gave money to, compare them with legislators of the same party in the same chamber who got none, and count the pro-labor bills each one put their own name on as primary sponsor.
Funded legislators are the primary sponsor of 4.2× more pro-labor bills than their unfunded colleagues in the same party. The median gap across 55 comparisons is +9.4 points, and 26 of the 55 clear ten points.
The obvious objection is that unions simply fund prolific legislators — people who introduce more of everything. That is testable, and it fails. The same funded legislators write only 1.44× more bills of all kinds against 4.17× more pro-labor ones, and their pro-labor output beats their own overall baseline in 10 of the 10 cases we tested. The effect is specific to labor, not a general busyness effect.
One methodological note that matters: we count primary sponsors only. Adding your name to someone else’s bill is cheap; being the person who files it is not.
More bills written should mean more bills passed. It does not, to any degree we can find.
Pro-labor bills authored by funded legislators pass at 57.6%. The same bills from unfunded legislators pass at 56.5%. That gap is roughly one point, on the outcome the whole chain is supposed to be for.
Look at it per comparison and it gets stranger. Funded legislators run +5.2 points ahead of their colleagues on the passage rate of all their other bills — and −8.8 points behind on their pro-labor ones. These are effective legislators, doing worse than average on exactly the bills the money is about.
That has a mundane explanation. A pro-labor bill in a chamber that does not want one is a hard bill to pass, whoever files it, and the extra bills a funded legislator files are disproportionately the ambitious ones. Money buys introduction. Introduction is not passage.
None of which makes the spending pointless. Filing a bill puts a position on the record, forces a hearing, builds the version that passes two sessions later. But if the theory is we fund champions and they deliver statutes, the delivery step is where we lose the trail.
The last legislative link is the one most people assume is the whole story: does a legislator who took union money vote with labor more often than one who did not?
Comparing legislators of the same party on final-passage votes, the funded ones side with labor about 1.8 points more often. Across 55 comparisons the range runs from −5.0 to +18.1.
Comparing within party is the whole point. A Democrat and a Republican differ on labor bills by far more than two points, and union money goes overwhelmingly to Democrats. Compare across parties and you will measure the party and call it the money.
Two points is not nothing on a knife-edge vote. It is a long way from the transaction the phrase “union money buys votes” describes.
Which leaves the first link in the chain, and the one we most expected to confirm: does union money get allies elected? We matched union contributions to 5,361 candidates in the six states where certified results can be joined to campaign finance by name, and looked at races decided by under ten points.
The six states do not give the same answer, and they are not close.
How much more often a union-funded candidate won, in races decided by under ten points. Beside each state is how many candidates it contributes to that comparison. The largest gaps sit in the thinnest samples, and the deepest sample shows nothing at all.
The spread is 42 points wide, and it runs backwards against sample size. Washington — the deepest close-race sample, the longest campaign-finance history, and the only one of the six that publishes its own certified export — shows nothing whatsoever. The three largest gaps come from the three thinnest samples.
The largest sustained bet on a single candidate anywhere in the file sits outside those six states. The Chicago Teachers Union gave $5,487,921 to Friends of Brandon Johnson between February 2019 and January 2025, on the Illinois State Board of Elections disclosure record; Johnson, a former CTU organizer, won the Chicago mayoralty in April 2023 with 51.4%.
A sitting member defending their seat wins about 96% of the time with union money and about 94% without — nothing, in every state we looked at. And union money goes overwhelmingly to candidates in seats that were never in doubt. Whether it swings a genuinely close race remains unproven either way by this data.
For a union treasurer: the two links that hold are the ballot box for measures and the sponsorship line for bills. The link that does not is passage — which is an argument for spending differently rather than spending less. The marginal dollar that produces one more introduced bill appears to buy less than the same dollar spent on whatever gets an already-introduced bill to the floor.
For anyone who assumes union money buys votes: the within-party gap on final passage is about two points, and it is the most durable number in this project. Legislators who take union money were already voting with labor. That is largely why they took it.
For everyone else: five links, tested separately, is the only way this question gets an honest answer. Treated as a single claim, “union political spending works” is both true and false depending on which link you had in mind.
Form LM-2 filings from the Labor Department’s Office of Labor-Management Standards, which every union above $250,000 in annual receipts must file. The fiscal-2025 file we worked from holds 4,599 LM-2s. Locals are ranked on the dues they spent on political activity, not on their PAC. The two are legally separate pots — federal law bars dues money from funding federal candidates — and treating them as interchangeable is the single easiest way to get this subject wrong.
Campaign-finance filings from twelve states — Washington, Illinois, California, Arizona, New York, Massachusetts, Oregon, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota and Pennsylvania — plus the Federal Election Commission. Committees are matched to unions from the committee’s own registered name rather than the FEC’s affiliated-organization field, which is unreliable enough to label a national fund after a single local branch.
Bills, primary sponsorships and recorded floor votes from LegiScan. 1,969 bills were classified by direction — 575 pro-labor, 54 anti-labor, 1,340 neutral. That direction is our judgement, from keyword rules plus a model reading the bill, and it is not a record of any union’s stated position on any bill.
Candidate outcomes come from certified returns, never from our own copies of election data: Washington’s own certified export for that state, and OpenElections for Arizona, California, Oregon, Michigan and New York. Ballot-measure outcomes were looked up one measure at a time, each with its own source recorded against it. Nothing about a result is derived.
Every result compares union-funded legislators with unfunded ones of the same party in the same chamber. One comparison is one union in one state, split by party; there are 55 of them. A candidate who stood in more than one of these elections is counted once for each. Where a state’s campaign-finance record begins later than its election results, the earlier years are dropped rather than scored — otherwise every candidate in those years reads as unfunded.
Stated up front, because a finding is only as good as the boundary around it.
This analysis runs on one join: the federal and state campaign-finance record sitting next to bills, sponsorships and the recorded floor votes of all fifty state legislatures. That layer is what every Civly report, donor list, and compliance check is built on.
Civly Politics Research · prepared August 13, 2026. Sources: U.S. Department of Labor LM-2 filings, the Federal Election Commission, campaign-finance filings from twelve states, LegiScan, the Washington Secretary of State’s certified results export, and OpenElections. Ballot-measure outcomes were looked up individually with a source recorded for each.
Figures reflect data available on that date. The fiscal-2025 LM-2 file continues to receive late filings, and published ballot-measure vote shares are subject to reconciliation against each state’s own certified return.
Findings describe association in observed data. Nothing here establishes that any expenditure caused any outcome, and the pro-labor or anti-labor direction assigned to a bill is Civly’s classification rather than any union’s stated position. Not legal, compliance, or investment advice.