About 16 million Americans will use a chatbot to help decide at least one contest in November. The dominant way they do it is not “who should I vote for.” It is photographing the ballot, being declined, and rephrasing the question until the model answers. Here is what is measured, what is modeled, and exactly how it happens.
Estimated A Civly model. It re-weights Pew’s February 2026 age crosstabs from adults onto the midterm electorate, then applies the conversion rates measured after Scotland’s May 2026 election. Every step is shown below.
In 2024 the AI layer of an American election barely existed, and where it did exist the platforms turned it off. Two years later it is a mass behavior with a monitoring industry built around it.
Voter prompts below are quoted from published reporting. Model responses are described rather than reproduced.
Rikki Powers, in Baltimore, photographed her ballot and asked Claude for bullet points on each candidate, then checked the links it returned before she voted. She put her research time at 20 hours down to one.
Mia Taylor, in Los Angeles County, photographed her ballot and asked Claude outright. It declined, citing political bias. She reframed, and got what she wanted anyway.
Chris Johnson, in Atlanta — a registered Republican with a 40-year voting history who describes himself as libertarian — hit the same refusal before Georgia’s May primary, and routed around it by naming a source of truth.
Both voters got an answer on the second ask. The guardrail did not stop either of them; it changed the shape of the question, and the answer came back looking like sourced research rather than a recommendation.
Robert Siebelink, in Corona, California, faced 61 candidates for governor plus a slate of lower-profile races. He uploaded the ballot, asked Claude to suggest candidates aligned with his values, narrowed the governor’s race to two, then asked it to reason about strategy. Ballot complete in under 30 minutes.
Jeremiah Hain, in Los Angeles, used ChatGPT for mayor and other offices — “I don’t have the time, nor did I want to do the same kind of research” — then posted a TikTok showing others how to repeat it. The method propagates socially.
60% of US adults read AI-generated summaries at the top of search results. A voter who searches sample ballot [county] or a judge’s name receives a synthesized answer whether or not they wanted one. Pew found that 10% were unsure whether they had ever read an AI summary, which means self-reported AI use will always undercount the real figure.
AI’s share of the decision is near zero at the top of the ticket and largest at the bottom. Senate and governor races come with a party cue, saturation advertising and news coverage. A nonpartisan county judgeship comes with none of those. That is where a voter has no substitute, and where the model’s answer can be the only input. Analysis
| Contest type | Party cue | Other information available | AI’s likely role |
|---|---|---|---|
| US Senate / Governor | Strong | Saturation ads, news, debates | Negligible |
| US House | Strong | Some coverage in competitive seats | Minor |
| State legislature | Present | Thin to none | Meaningful |
| Ballot measures | None | Legalese text, partisan mailers | Substantial |
| Judicial / county / school board | Often none | Effectively none | Can be decisive |
Cornell’s experiments found that chatbot conversations moved likely Trump voters 3.9 points toward Harris on a 100-point scale — roughly four times the effect of a political ad — and that a persuasion-optimized model shifted opposition voters 25 points. If even a tenth of the down-ballot consultations land on a genuinely open choice, that is on the order of one to two million votes shaped by model output, concentrated in races decided by hundreds. Colorado’s 3rd district was decided by 546 votes in 2022. Analysis
A monitoring-and-optimization industry formed around this behavior in 2026, which is itself evidence that the behavior is real at scale.
| Operation | Who runs it | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| CampSight | Run for Something Action Fund | Runs AI chats in real browser sessions to mimic voters, across ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini. 300,000+ campaign-focused conversations analyzed, with a waitlist of 60+ campaigns and roughly 400 candidates. |
| Caucus AI | Two chief analytics officers from the 2024 Harris campaign | Tracks what Gemini, Grok and ChatGPT say about candidates state by state, stores the responses, and exposes which sources the models drew on. |
| Research Books | American Bridge 21st Century | Gives chatbots direct access to opposition research files on 2026 House, Senate and Governor Republicans. |
| AI Narratives | CivlyOurs | Probes all seven engines — ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, Perplexity, Grok, Google’s AI Overviews and Google’s AI Mode — on the questions voters type, grades every answer helps / neutral / hurts for the race, and returns the sources each engine leaned on plus the pages to publish to change them. |
Tom Steyer spent over $200 million in California’s gubernatorial primary and finished third. Run for Something’s analysis found that chatbots ranked him sixth on affordability, cost-of-living and education-funding questions. Causation is unproven — but it is the argument every campaign is now hearing. Estimated
A model that states only true things but omits half the candidates still decides the race for whoever asked.
| # | Step | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Take Pew’s February 2026 chatbot use by age (18–29: 66% · 30–49: 61% · 50–64: 42% · 65+: 23%) and re-weight it from US adults onto the 2026 midterm electorate, using the 2022 CPS shape in which voters 65 and over are 30.4% of the electorate. | 49% → 44.1% |
| 2 | Correct back up for education and income. Voters are about 8pp more likely to hold a BA; Quinnipiac finds a 14-point education gradient (60% against 46%) and a steep income one (72% above $200k against 42% below $50k). | +2pp |
| 3 | Age the February data forward to November. Pew’s series runs 23% → 33% → 49%; Quinnipiac’s research-use figure ran 37% → 51% in eleven months. Blended, with saturation deceleration. | +6pp → 52% |
| 4 | Apply the conversion rates measured after the fact in Scotland (Survation / Strathclyde, n=1,042): 29% of adults used AI for election information and 7% used it to help decide — a 62% query rate among AI users, and a 24% decision rate among those who queried. Adjusted upward for US ballot length and vote-by-mail. | ×66% ×38% |
| 5 | Multiply by turnout: a voting-eligible population of roughly 247M at 47–52% turnout, central case 49%. | 121M ballots |
52% of voters using AI at all × 66% = the 34% who query about the election; × 38% = the 13% who use it to decide. The third tier carries Pew’s 60% AI-summary readership onto the same electorate.
It is the only place a real electorate has been measured after the fact. A Scottish voter casts two votes for parties they already know; a US midterm voter faces 15 to 40 contests including nonpartisan judges and legalese ballot measures — decisions with no party cue and no substitute source. Roughly a third of US ballots are also filled out at home with a phone in hand. Offsetting downward: lower midterm salience, and heavy straight-ticket voting.
Falsifiable predictions. If a US pollster finally asks before November, we expect “used AI to help decide” at 8–12%, “used AI for election information” at 25–35%, and under-40 decision use at 20–28%. Expect the first figure to land below our 13%: fewer than 1 in 10 Americans think it is even a good idea for voters to use chatbots to pick candidates, and 76% trust AI output “hardly ever” or only sometimes, so admitting to it is low-status. Treat that gap as the social-desirability discount, not as a failure of the model. If it comes in above 15% or below 5%, the ballot-complexity adjustment in step 4 is what broke.
Nobody has measured this directly. The three headline figures are modeled, not observed. The load-bearing assumption is that a Scottish voter choosing between parties they already know converts to an AI question at a rate that tells you anything about an American facing 40 contests and a nonpartisan judge. We adjusted that rate upward and said by how much, but the adjustment is a judgment, not a measurement.
The two sixteen-millions are not corroboration. Caucus AI counts voters who received election information from AI during the primaries, which is closer to our 42M tier. Ours counts voters who will use AI to help decide a race in November. Same number, different quantity, arrived at independently — and it would be a mistake to read either as confirming the other.
The four patterns are five voters in one newspaper account. They show the shape of the behavior, not its size. Nothing about how Powers, Taylor, Johnson, Siebelink or Hain filled out a ballot establishes how many people do the same thing, and the projection does not rest on them.
Every voter in the 42M tier is asking an engine about a candidate, and the engine answers with whatever it can find. Find out what it currently says about yours — and what to publish to change it.
Civly Politics Research · prepared August 20, 2026. No US survey has yet asked voters whether they used AI to decide their vote — not Pew, AP-NORC, Quinnipiac, Gallup, Ipsos, Harvard IOP, Verasight or States United. Every figure on this page is therefore tagged Measured, Estimated or Analysis, and the November projection is modeled from adjacent measurements rather than observed directly.
Voter prompts are quoted from published reporting, principally the Philadelphia Inquirer’s July 2026 account. Model responses are described rather than reproduced. Estimated figures carry the stated method and its ranges; anything labeled Analysis is Civly’s interpretation and is not a measurement.
Findings describe measured and modeled behavior. Nothing here establishes that any chatbot answer caused any vote. Not legal, compliance, or investment advice.